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ABSTRACT
This theoretical article highlights limitations in the current trend
towards dichotomizing full ownership and access-based consump-
tion by recognizing a broader, more complex array of ‘fragmented’
10ownership conﬁgurations in the context of digital virtual goods
(DVGs). In challenging this dichotomy, we recognise that the
relationship between ownership and possession becomes particu-
larly signiﬁcant. We therefore consider how prominent DVG own-
ership conﬁgurations may shape the way in which possession is
15assembled, potentially reducing consumers’ scope of action rela-
tive to DVGs and leaving possession susceptible to disruption.
Conversely, we acknowledge ways in which consumers’ continued
attempts at possession may impinge upon the agency of owner-
ship mechanisms within the market. Our analysis ultimately builds
20upon existing understandings of both ownership and possession,
theorizing their often overlooked relation in consumption.
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Introduction
Recent years have seen suggestions of consumers moving away from ownership
towards access-based consumption. However, claims of a ‘post-ownership economy’
(Belk, 2014bAQ3 ) or ‘age of access’ (Rifkin, 2000) assume a position that dichotomizes full
25ownership (total, exclusive rights to goods) and access-based (temporary, limited use of
goods) modes of consumption that may obscure signiﬁcant fragmented or partial own-
ership conﬁgurations and the enduring signiﬁcance of possession.
The limitations of this dichotomy become particularly apparent in the context of a
range of digital goods and services. Our ‘possessions’, the things we call our own,
30increasingly extend beyond the tangible. We may use the term ‘ digital virtual goods’
(DVGs) to describe objects, which cannot be used in material reality but exist within
digital virtual spaces (see Denegri-Knott & Molesworth, 2010), accessed via devices such
as laptop computers, mobile phones and videogame consoles. This trend has been well-
documented (see Belk, 2013; Denegri-Knott & Molesworth, 2010; Koiso-Kanttil, 2004;
35Lehdonvirta, 2012; Molesworth & Denegri-Knott, 2012; Rowley, 2008) and we can
observe a broadening array of DVGs; alongside locally stored digital photographs,
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eBooks and digital music we have witnessed the emergence of digital content hosted
online by social media platforms, e-mail providers and online games.
DVGs have been implicated in the move to assess-based consumption, credited with
40potential to liberate consumers from the burdens of ownership (Bardhi, Eckhardt, &
Arnould, 2012; Belk, 2013, 2014b; Rifkin, 2000, 2014; Shaefer, Lawson, & Kukar-Kinney,
forthcoming) and championed as candidates for communal sharing (Belk, 2010, 2013,
2014b; Giesler, 2006) and short-term access (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). They are seen to
be malleable and vaporous enough to fulﬁl consumers’ functional, situational and
45identity needs without the responsibilities associated with ownership (Bardhi et al.,
2012). Such ‘access-based’ (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012) or ‘non-ownership’ (Moeller &
Wittkowski, 2010) consumption apparently positions ownership as too cumbersome to
keep up with the speed of delivery oﬀered by Internet-enabled platforms (Rifkin, 2002).
Indeed, recent years have seen the emergence of an array of digital access-based
50business models. Netﬂix, for instance, reached 44 million subscribers in January 2014
(Garrahan, 2014), whilst the number of paying Spotify subscribers doubled to 10 million
in 18 months prior to May 2014 (Cooks, 2014).
However, we propose that many DVGs cannot be classiﬁed as either fully owned or
merely accessed, and that a recognition of an array of ‘fragmented’ ownership conﬁg-
55urations is required in order to understand new models and market systems.
In breaking down the ownership-access dichotomy, we recognise that the relation-
ship between ownership and possession becomes particularly signiﬁcant. In prior studies
of material possession, objects were assumed to be owned ‘in full’ and consequently
ownership and possession are conﬂated with any relationship between them unproble-
60matic and therefore made absent. Conversely, consumers apparently rarely desire to
possess goods that are merely accessed temporarily (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). Despite
the rhetoric of access, consumers may still desire to possess and form meaningful bonds
with DVGs (see Denegri-Knott, Watkins, & Wood, 2012; Odom, Zimmerman, & Forlizzi,
2011; Wang, Zhao, & Bamossy, 2009; Watkins & Molesworth, 2012) and where fragmen-
65ted, partial ownership conﬁgurations emerge in this context it begs the question of how
consumers’ limited ownership may shape such possession. The risk of maintaining an
ownership/access dichotomy is to obscure not only fragmented ownership conﬁgura-
tions, but also the implications of these conﬁgurations for how people, things, other
people and devices relate in ‘possession’.
70We draw from ideas in the actor-network theory tradition (see Latour, 2005; Law,
2004, 2008) to propose that ownership conﬁgurations may shape the way in which
possession is assembled, and vice versa. We consider both how fragmented ownership
may reduce consumers’ scope of action relative to how DVGs are possessed and leave
possession susceptible to disruption, and conversely, how consumers’ continued posses-
75sion attempts may impinge upon the agency of ownership mechanisms within the
market. In doing so, we build upon existing understandings of both ownership and
possession and, more signiﬁcantly, their relation, uniting the disparate bodies of work
that have deﬁned ownership as legal or socially recognised rights to an object and have
conceptualised possession as a relationship to an object characterised by proprietary
80feelings and self-identiﬁcation.
We begin by considering the separation of ownership and possession within market-
ing and consumer research, and proceed to discuss how actor-network theoretical
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principles may reveal their connection in new ways. In moving beyond the access-
ownership dichotomy, we then map out a range of prominent ownership conﬁgurations
85in the DVG market, before exploring their potential impact upon consumer possession
practices and noting related market implications. We conclude with a summary of our
contribution and a discussion of implications for further research.
The separation of ownership and possession
In both marketing practice and the day-to-day lives of consumers, the roles of both
90ownership and possession are signiﬁcant. Intellectual property (IP) represents a large
proportion of the value of businesses (Ryder & Madhavan, 2014), whilst almost every-
thing consumers do involves possessory relationships and property rights (Rudmin,
1988). Consequently these concepts have been the subject of signiﬁcant study in law,
economics, philosophy, psychology and anthropology ( see, e.g.  Beaglehole, 1932; Locke,
951690 /1967 ; Macpherson, 1978; Munzer, 1990; Rudmin, 1988, 1991; Schlatter, 1951),
alongside marketing and consumer research ( e.g. Ahuvia, 2005; Bardhi Eckhardt &
Arnould, 2012; Belk, 1988; Epp & Price, 2010; Price Arnould & Curasi, 2000). The connec-
tion between ownership and possession, however, remains vague.
Inattention to this relationship may be rooted in two key tendencies: (1) the con-
100sideration of possession at the micro level of the agentic consumer subject, separate
from studies of ownership that are more often located at a meso or macro level, and (2)
a presentation of ownership in the marketing and consumer research literature as a
total, coherent concept that renders its relationship to possession as apparently unpro-
blematic. In this section, we consider the emergence of these tendencies, and the ways
105in which challenging them may enrich our understanding of contemporary ownership
and possession.
Deﬁning ownership and possession
Ownership is generally deﬁned as a legally and/or socially sanctioned arrangement
between people with respect to a thing and other people, where the ‘thing’ in question
110may include land, material objects or even ideas (Gaus, 2012; Munzer, 1990). Three major
approaches to ownership have been dominant in the last century of political and legal
thought: Full Liberal Ownership, Bundle and Integrated theories.
Full Liberal Ownership approaches assume ownership in toto, including (a) unlim-
ited use of a resource (b) ability to exclude others and (c) rights of transfer (sell, gift,
115destroy) (Honoré, 1961). From this perspective, ownership is ‘that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world,
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe’ (Blackstone
cited Grey, 1980, p. 75). In discussions of access-based consumption and a ‘post-
ownership economy’ (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Belk, 2010, 2014b; Chen, 2009; Moeller
120& Wittkowski, 2010; Rifkin, 2000), ownership is presented in line with such Full Liberal
Ownership approaches, existing in full or not at all. However, legal scholars have long
argued that this approach has lost its relevance due to a ‘fragmentation’ of owner-
ship that became apparent in the  twentieth century. A key proponent of Bundle
Theory, Grey (1980) has pointed out that in the late twentieth century, the law was
JOURNAL OF MARKETING MANAGEMENT 3
125no longer dealing with ownership as a cohesive authority over things. Instead,
ownership should be conceptualized as a ‘bundle of sticks’, each representing a
right regarding the object of ownership (for instance, the right of control, of
exclusion or of disposition), and where ‘sticks’ or rights can be distributed in varying
ways amongst a range of ‘owners’ (Hofhed, 1901AQ4 cited in Munzer, 1990).
130Integrated approaches accept that whilst ownership may be fragmented amongst
diﬀerent owners, speciﬁc rights over a resource remain organised in some coherent fashion
(Attas, 2006; Gaus, 2012). For example, Attas (2005, 2006) sees ownership as having both
content (speciﬁc rights with respect to the ‘thing’ in question) and form (the characteristics
of the rights themselves). Here, the content of ownership consists of control rights (the right
135to access an object, use it as one wishes, and manage who uses it and how) and income
rights (entitlement to advantages that emerge from direct action upon the object). These
rights themselves vary in form, which Attas considers in terms of continuity (the right’s
duration and whether it can be lawfully be taken from the consumer) and transferability
(the extent to which rights can be transferred to another party).
140From this perspective, goods are neither fully owned nor not owned; variations in
content and form instead produce a diverse spectrum of ownership conﬁgurations. A
range of common conﬁgurations are frequently discussed in law, such as usus (right to
use or enjoy an object of ownership without altering it), fructus (right to derive proﬁt
from this object) and usufruct (unites rights of usus and fructus), however Attas’ work
145calls for a recognition of a much broader array of ownership conﬁgurations. In drawing
particularly from the work of Attas (2006, 2006), we propose that the apparent reduction
in the importance of ownership noted in previous work (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Belk,
2013; Chen, 2009) might alternatively be interpreted as evidence of an ongoing reconﬁ-
guration of rights.
150Within the macromarketing literature, there is already recognition of fragmented
ownership forms. For instance, the Bundle Theory approach has been used by Haase
and Kleinaltenkamp (2011) in their study of property rights theory and co-creation
where they deﬁne ownership as a contractual mediator between market actors operat-
ing on a dual plane; one in relation to owning resources outright (typical of most
155commodity exchange) and the other to the right to use that resource in a particular
way (as in the case of services businesses). However, such meso- or macro-level analysis
oﬀers little insight into how ownership may relate to possession in these contexts.
Elsewhere the marketing literature considers ownership in the context of DVGs, typically
steered by either an ethical mandate to account for the discourses that justify ownership
160arrangements of digital content (Denegri-Knott, 2004AQ5 ; Giesler, 2008; Nill & Geipel, 2010
AQ6
),
accusations of exploited consumer labour (Bonsu & Darmody, 2008; Ritzer & Jurgenson,
2010; Scholz, 2012AQ7 ), concerns surrounding copyright infringement (Peitz & Waelbroeck,
2006; Phau, Teah, & Lwin, 2014; Sundararajan, 2004), or interest in the tensions and
conﬂicts between co-producing parties (Harwood & Garry, 2010, 2014). However despite
165this work on ownership in digital contexts, we still lack an understanding that relates
DVG ownership conﬁgurations to possession.
In contrast to ownership as socially or legally recognised rights to an object, the term
‘possession’ usually implies personal identiﬁcation with the item as an extension of the
self (Belk, 1982, 1983, 1988) and refers to ‘things we call ours’ (Belk, 1988, p. 139)
170regardless of whether we legally own them. This use of the term is akin to discussions
4 R. D. WATKINS ET AL.
of ‘psychological ownership’ in psychology, distinct from legal ownership and deﬁned as
‘the state in which individuals feel as though the target of ownership, or a piece of that
target is “theirs”’ (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003, p. 85). Thus possession is distinct from
the rights to interact with objects in certain ways (ownership), but refers to a conviction
175that something is ours and is part of who we are. As Belk notes, ‘to possess something,
whether legally or not, involves proprietary feelings’ and to acquire these feelings it ‘may
be necessary to perform certain possession rituals’ (Belk, 2014a, p. 33–34). Possessions
become distinct from commodities (deﬁned by their exchange value), since they have
become subjectiﬁed (Miller, 1987) or singularized (Kopytoﬀ, 1986), and thus separated
180(at least temporarily) from the commodity sphere. Merely touching an object may lead
to a sense of perceived ownership or possession (Peck & Shu, 2009), but usually coming
to possess objects involves practices such as cleaning (Gregson & Crewe, 2003;
McCracken, 1986) and personalizing items (Belk, Wallendorf, & Sherry, 1989), and singu-
larisation over time as objects’ histories become interwoven with our own (Belk, 1990,
1851991; Grayson & Shulman, 2000AQ8 ), whilst appropriation may also result from habituation
through use (e.g. the chair in the coﬀee shop or classroom that is ‘my’ chair). Through
such processes, possessions can become receptacles of public and personal meanings
(Richins, 1994a, 1994b; Wallendorf & Arnould, 1988), and utilised as resources for identity
projects (Ahuvia, 2005; Belk, 1988; Kleine, Kleine, & Allen, 1995). Thus possession
190becomes more than just a psychological phenomenon as it involves practices of using,
controlling, caring for and managing objects of possession.
Such acts assume a level of control that may be enabled or restricted by ownership.
We might assume that it is only under conditions of full ownership that consumers can
engage in the curatorial, ritualistic or habitual practices needed to transition commod-
195ities into personal possessions, for example. Yet we hold a limited understanding of this
relationship as much of what consumers have previously possessed has also been
owned ‘in full’. Despite acknowledgement that consumers may legally own a good
but never view it as truly belonging to them (McCracken, 1986), or may view goods as
possessions despite a lack of legal ownership (Belk, 1988; Etzioni, 1991; Pierce et al.,
2002003), within marketing literature our understanding of the inter-relation of ownership
and possession remains limited.
Relationship between ownership and possession
A relationship between ownership and possession has already been suggested by
Rudmin’s (1990, 1988) intellectual history of the psychology of property that brings
205together cognitive and utilitarian philosophies to explain that the only way in which
objects can provide the security necessary to guarantee expectation of future use and
enjoyment is total ownership. Once an object of consumption is owned in full one can
imagine future uses and enjoyments, and these guarantees are provided through
societal approbation and by the sanction of the law. Further aﬁeld, the ownership-
210possession couplet has also been supported on moral grounds. Ownership is needed
because it provides the space and privacy required for the cultivation of goods as
expressions of one’s identity and personality as acts of will (Demsetz, 1967; Hegel,
1967/1821; Munzer, 1990; Snare, 1972). Thus when these guarantees are missing, for
instance when a good is rented, borrowed or stolen, consumers’ identity work and
JOURNAL OF MARKETING MANAGEMENT 5
215singularising attempts, and thus possession, may be compromised. Legal analysts have
noted that if full ownership is missing, possession can be ‘bizarre and unstable’ (Munzer,
1990). Possession of objects that may be acquired illicitly are, according to Litwinski
(cited in Rudmin, 1990), not properly possessed because they fail on the requirement
that future use is guaranteed. The illegal MP3 therefore, following Litwinski’s line of
220argument, may be akin to a stolen apple in its ‘tense and tenuous possession’ (Rudmin,
1990, p. 317) because it lacks the social approval needed to enjoy listening openly and
guilt free.
More recently, linkages between possession and ownership have been implied in
research into new modes of consumption in situations of non-ownership. This is seen in
225the shift from (full) ownership to access (e.g. Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Belk, 2014b; Chen,
2009; Durgee & O’Connor, 1995; Moeller & Wittkowski, 2010; Rifkin, 2000), whereby
access-based consumption represents ‘transactions that may be market mediated in
which no transfer of ownership takes place’ (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012, p. 1). Instead the
individual merely acquires ‘consumption time’ with the object, through either market-
230mediated models such as renting (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012) or non- market-mediated
access models such as sharing (Belk, 2010; Ozanne & Ballantine, 2010AQ9 ) and borrowing
(Jenkins, Molesworth, & Scullion, 2014). For Bardhi and Eckhardt (2012), the major
diﬀerences between ownership and access reside in the nature of the rules governing
the object-self relationship. For example, in their Zipcar study the limits to possession
235adopt the form of a Big Brother governance model where use is monitored in order to
prevent damage to the cars. When renting cars, there is an emphasis on short-term use
value and acts that might facilitate appropriation such as caring for, cleaning and
personalising cars are not performed (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012).
Regardless of suggestions in the literature that ownership and possession may be
240linked, there is little elaboration of this relationship. This may be due to the tendency
to separate ownership and possession as discrete areas of study with macro-level
marketing research dealing with ownership taking place separately from micro-level
studies of consumer experiences of possession to the extent that separate journals and
conferences have been established for their study. Indeed Slater (2011) proposes that
245marketing has been rendered impossible by a process of ‘puriﬁcation’, which has led to
divisions between economics and the cultural disciplines, with economics largely
ignoring cultural factors in its analysis of formal rationality, whilst cultural disciplines
focus on meaning-making, often disregarding commercial aspects of consumption
practices. Consequently we lack an understanding of the ways in which ownership
250may shape the possession of goods and, vice versa, how a desire to possess may shape
both legal and technical systems of governance and the creation of new market
oﬀerings.
Again, this may have been relatively unproblematic when those material goods
consumers possessed tended to be fully owned, for instance, a beloved family table
255(see Epp & Price, 2010) or vintage purse (see Ahuvia, 2005). In contrast, consumers
appear to have little desire to possess objects that are merely accessed temporarily such
as rented cars (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012), once again rendering the relationship between
ownership and possession apparently of little importance. However, the apparent reduc-
tion in importance of ownership noted in assess-based consumption research (Bardhi &
260Eckhardt, 2012; Belk, 2014b, Chen, 2009) might be seen as a manifestation of the
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fragmentation of ownership rights. That is, in many cases ownership is not absent but
rather is present in fragmented forms that distribute rights to use objects in speciﬁc
ways. This does not necessarily mean that the importance of ownership recedes as has
been claimed, but rather that ownership continues to moderate consumers’ objectual
265relationships, but in new and possibly restrictive ways that require a better understand-
ing of how ownership and possession act upon each other.
Realities of ownership and possession
In order to overcome problems arising from this ‘puriﬁcation’ of ownership and posses-
sion in marketing and consumer research, we might: (1) recognise them as distinct, but
270always linked entities, and; (2) discard attempts to understand them as essentialist, ﬁnite
concepts and instead approach them as concurrently produced, stabilised and de-
stabilised entities.
Such intervention is possible by adopting principles from actor-network theory (ANT)
(see Latour, 2005; Law, 2004, 2008). ANT treats ‘everything in the social and natural
275worlds as a continuously generated eﬀect of the webs of relations within which they are
located’, arguing that no entity exists outside of such webs (Law, 2008, p. 141). Work
within the ANT tradition typically adopts a distinct set of principles, including most
prominently the notions of relational materiality (reality is enacted or performed by
networks of heterogeneous actants and it is in these relations that agency is located),
280and ontological symmetry (divisions such as subject/object or nature/culture exist only
as enacted rather than a priori) (Latour, 2005; Law, 2004). How then does such a
perspective shift the way in which we view ownership and possession?
ANT necessarily rejects claims that there could be an ex ante notion of either
‘possession’ or ‘ownership’. Possession, for instance, must rather be approached as a
285patterned relationship between things, people, devices and knowledge that become
aligned in a particular way when possessing takes place. This means that in making sense
of ownership and possession, we might trace movement, or translations in their net-
works, understanding them as relational matter. In particular, ontological symmetry calls
for a ﬂat ontology that avoids a priori privileging of actants. Often in the literature, we
290ﬁnd that material possessions are presented as ontologically inferior, passive targets of
human action (e.g. consumers, marketers or lawyers ). Within consumer research, for
example agentic consumer subjects are privileged as they cultivate their possessions’
meanings, move them through various stages in their biographies, and employ them in
identity projects. Other necessary elements in possession, for instance, the objects
295themselves, storage space, locks and keys, digital devices and people needed in per-
forming possession are made manifest absent (Law, 2004), with limited exceptions (see
Epp & Price, 2010); from an ANT perspective, we might observe that complex assem-
blages are ‘black boxed’, hiding actants and their agency (Latour, 2005). This is in
keeping with a broader tendency within interpretivist consumer research to take the
300consumer as the primary unit of analysis, disregarding aspects of consumer culture
which do not present themselves in consumers’ lived experiences (Askegaard &
Linnet, 2011; Moisander, Peñaloza & Valtonen, 2009; Moisander, Valtonen, & Hirsto,
2009) and overlooking non-human sources of agency (Bajde, 2013). Increasingly, how-
ever, consumer research has moved beyond such  micro-level analyses (e.g. Arsel &
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305Thompson, 2011; Bettany & Kerrane, 2011; Giesler, 2012; Scaraboto & Fischer, 2013), and
studies of possession have already begun to consider non-human agencies. For instance,
Bardhi et al. (2012) consider how global nomadism produces liquid relationships with
possessions, whilst Epp and Price (2010) explore the inﬂuence of a range of actors from
identity practices to competing consumption objects. Ownership, however, remains
310largely overlooked within these analyses despite its signiﬁcant role in enacting or
assembling possession.
We might acknowledge that possession in a market society has historically
attained stability via ‘ownership’ acting to set preferential ways in which diﬀerent
elements (objects, devices, ways of doing) come together in ‘possessing’. From an
315ANT perspective, this may also be understood as ontological politics (Law, 2004; Mol,
1999). Realities are assembled, but in any one case we might ask which actants’
purposes are best served in that reality and in ensuring that alternatives are not
enacted. ‘Ownership’ makes certain conﬁgurations of possession possible while deny-
ing others, making it more likely that certain arrangements can be enacted and
320stabilised.
Let us illustrate this. In the case of a rented house, ownership links people to the
property and to each other in ways that may vary greatly; some will only be able to
reside in the property but not modify it, whereas others will be able to proﬁt from the
property through rental or sale under certain conditions, and at certain times modify it
325(Attas, 2006; Gaus, 2012). All, however, may call the house ‘theirs’, even as they hold
diﬀerent objectual relations with the house (and to each other) and hence diﬀerent
means of enacting possession. In this sense, we can see how ownership acts to deﬁne
how diﬀerent actants (things and people) should relate in possessing and so shapes the
realities of how possession is enacted. This is equivalent to the role that has been
330attributed to economic and business theories in the making of market performances,
spaces, subjects and actors (Araujo, 2007AQ10 ; Callon, 1997; Cochoy, 2008
AQ11
; MacKenzie,
Muniesa, & Siu, 2007; Slater, 2002) and indeed such theories also remain active in how
ownership and possession are shaped and re-shaped.
While there are many possible permutations, some ownership conﬁgurations are
335already captured by Attas’ (2006) work and we now repurpose this as scaﬀolding.
Speciﬁcally, possible combinations of content and form in ownership rights specify
how, by whom and for how long an object can be used, modiﬁed and moved along
or transferred (Attas, 2006). Returning to our example of a house, we see that for a
tenant the house can be accessed and used for the period of the lease, but he has a
340restricted ability to modify or proﬁt from it. For the landlord, on the other hand, typically
the home cannot be accessed or used during the tenancy, however she may hold
enduring rights to manage use of the home (to evict and select tenants, and to restrict
their use of the property), to modify the house (to re-decorate and build extensions) and
to proﬁt from it (via selling or leasing). In this example, we see ownership shaping
345possession upon three general dimensions: control – the degree of agency a consumer
has over an object in its use; continuity – the duration for which a consumer is awarded
access to and agency over an object and ﬁnally; transferability – the ability to move an
object through its cycle of biography, either through divestment, gifting, exchange or
destruction.
8 R. D. WATKINS ET AL.
350Ownership is not simply abstract, however, but also involves: a legal system which
details how property rights can/should be distributed; legal and law enforcement
professionals (lawyers, judges, police, prison guards) who understand and enforce this
legal system; related materials (including courts, prisons, locks, home security systems;
property law documents, contractual agreements and purchase receipts), and; law-
355abiding consumers who are aware of, and motivated to abide by property rights
legislation. Thus ownership conﬁgurations are enacted by complex heterogeneous net-
works of actants that for much of the time remain manifest absent (see Law, 2004). We
don’t notice them despite their necessity. Indeed their role only becomes apparent
when something ‘breaks’, for example when a contract is breached or something is
360stolen. However, the apparent stability of ownership masks the considerable actor-
network required to maintain assemblages in this way.
This is signiﬁcant when we consider DVGs. Digital technologies reveal new actors and
relations and therefore new realities of ownership and possession, and opportunities for
changes in ontological politics. For example, this is captured by Lessig’s (1999) observa-
365tions about the role of code in regulating behaviour:
 In real space, we recognize how laws regulate - through constitutions, statutes, and other
legal codes. In cyberspace we must understand how diﬀerent ‘ code’ regulates - how the
software and hardware (i.e. the ‘ code’ of cyberspace) that makes cyberspace what it is also
regulate cyberspace as it is (p. 5)
370Seen from an ANT perspective, Lessig’s concern is the power of code as an actant that
renders other agencies impotent, in particular those relating to legislation and social
norms. Code does away with human and material aspects of ownership and possession
networks such that only certain realities can be assembled. Code is ontological politics in
action. Although we might see code as only enforcing the will of the lawyers and
375managers, this would be to assume that software is merely an intermediary (doing no
more than transporting existing agencies) and to make manifest absent the agency of
the code itself, which continues to restrict behaviour, just as locks and alarm systems
continue to act to deny unauthorised access to our homes long after they have been
manufactured and installed. In an ANT sense then, software might be understood as a
380mediator, signiﬁcant and able to change the network, and with the agency distributed
amongst this network there is the possibility of interference by other actants at any
point.
We now see this proposed analytic in action by describing prominent DVG ownership
conﬁgurations and their relation to how DVGs may be possessed, according to core
385themes emerging from the available literature on possession.
Prominent DVG ownership conﬁgurations
In acquiring, using and accessing DVGs consumers must agree to End-User License
Agreements (EULAs) and/or Terms of Use/Service contracts that typically include restric-
tions on their use. Such agreements set out speciﬁc ways to enact possession by
390distributing bundles of rights that vary in content (dictating how DVGs are to be used,
modiﬁed or proﬁted from), and form (restricting for how long they may be possessed
and whether they may be gifted, bequeathed or sold). We capture dominant
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conﬁgurations in Figure 1, the grey areas representing a ‘distance’ from full ownership,
with the darker areas indicating the greatest divergence. We include examples of ‘full
395ownership’ (a purchased table as in Epp & Price, 2010 study) and of ‘access’ (a hire car as
studied by Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012 ) as well as examples of DVGs to illustrate the way
digital technologies allow for positions in between these two conﬁgurations.
Ownership rights are more easily enforced in the DVG market where surveillance and
monitoring are possible through digital technologies and access can be withdrawn or
400modiﬁed without a reliance on legal systems and professionals (e.g. a World of Warcraft
account may be closed and in-game content ‘reclaimed’ by Blizzard Entertainment
without any call to law enforcement agencies or bailiﬀs, or the presentation of evi-
dence). Lessig (1999) has already proposed that ‘code is law’ and companies now
encode restrictions into digital content themselves as automated forms of enforcement
405that replace the agency of material and human actors. Just as Watson and Shove (2008)
describe the re-distribution of competence as skill once held by only skilled painters
came to be embodied in non-drip paint, here we can observe the displaced agency of
social norms and legislative systems as code increasingly supersedes these actants in
restricting users’ behaviour. Thus we can observe distinct conﬁgurations in the context
410of DVGs, not only in terms of the fragmented bundles of rights consumers hold but also
in the re-distribution of agency. We now explore four prominent ownership conﬁgura-
tions: created, local content; non-transferrable licences; hosted content and 
 subscription-based services.
Created, local content
415Some DVGs align closely with the established full ownership conﬁgurations, as in the
case of locally stored DVGs created by and stored on consumer’s own devices outside of
contractual agreements, for instance, in the case of a photograph we have taken on our
camera and stored locally on our laptop. The preferential way of practicing possession is
deﬁned by a set of relationships between consumers, hardware (computers, cameras
420and various disc drives), software (operating systems and photo-viewing and editing
programmes), DVGs, conventional practices of storing photographs and computer use,
personal projects and goals and levels of commitment to photography and memory
keeping. The experience of possession, however, is relatively stable, secure and contin-
uous. Such photographs can be viewed as many times as desired, transferred to other
425devices, transformed with (licenced) photo-editing software, printed, sent to whom we
like, and even sold for proﬁt (a licence or a printed copy). However, the enactment of
such DVGs as possessions, unlike material goods still remains reliant on other devices
doing their bit. Access, alongside the ability to modify, copy, and store, requires hard-
ware and software with related licences. Thus even here we observe new actants
430embroiled in possession and the possibility that the actions of one such actant may
destabilise what is experienced as permanent ownership; a hard drive might fail or the
software used for viewing photographs may require an update, temporarily or perma-
nently denying use.
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 Subscription-based services
435A diﬀerent, but now prominent ownership conﬁguration operates for subscription-based
services such as Spotify and Netﬂix that enables users to stream media so long as they
continue to pay a monthly subscription fee, and here it is clear to users that they do not
own the content stored on the companies’ servers. These conﬁgurations draw parallels
with discussions of access-based consumption, liquid and temporary access to large
440archives of digital media reliant on subscription to a service alongside a computing
device and internet access, and with the complex data storage, server systems and
licensing agreements often made absent. In subscription-based services, software takes
responsibility for maintaining, or denying access controlled by accounts and passwords.
An access-ownership dichotomy might lead us to compare and contrast these
445extremes – created, local content and subscription-based services draw parallels with
prior comparisons of full ownership and access. However Figure 1 also acknowledges
fragmented ownership conﬁgurations – hosted content and non-transferable licences –
that present new conﬁgurations of ownership.
Full Ownership DVG Ownership Configurations Market-
Mediated 
Access
Created, Local 
content
Hosted Content Non-
Transferable 
Licence
Subscription 
Based Services
Examples Kitchen Table Locally stored 
photographs &
documents
Spotify, Netflix Hire Car
Right to Use Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted
Right to 
Transform
Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted Denied Denied Denied
Right to 
Income
Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted Denied Denied Denied
Transferability Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted Denied Denied Denied
Continuity
Typically 
enforced by:
Coding
Facebook profile, 
Flickr album, 
content within 
online games
iTunes album, 
Amazone Book
Permanent, 
subject to 
material space 
and security 
(locks).
Permanent -
with licenced 
software and 
hardware
Indefinite-
Requires active 
account, 
platform, and 
local hardware
Indefinite- with 
licenced software, 
hardware & active 
account
Temporary-
Requires active 
account, platform, 
and local hardware
Temporary, 
subject to locks 
and security 
devices.
Local legal 
systems
Contractual 
agreement, 
surveillance & 
coding
Contractual 
agreement, 
surveillance & 
coding
Contractual 
agreement, 
surveillance & 
coding
Contractual 
agreement. 
Legal systems
Figure 1.  Prominent ownership conﬁgurations in DVG markets.
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Non-transferable licences
450In downloading digital music, ﬁlms and eBooks from platforms such as Apple’s iTunes
store, Amazon’s Kindle Store or Google’s Play Store, the consumer purchases a non-
transferable licence to consume these DVGs in restricted ways. For instance, a con-
sumer may be granted the right to access an eBook only so long as they hold an
active account, have access to compatible hardware and software and abide by the
455agreed Terms of Service. They may not be permitted to read the eBook on a
competing device, and are likely denied the right to transfer (they may be unable
to pass on the eBook to a friend) or to appropriate returns (they will be unable to re-
sell). Companies will also typically reserve the right to terminate accounts where
consumers are deemed to have breached the contractual agreement, whilst digital
460rights management (DRM) technologies may be used to limit use, rather than legal
and law enforcement actants.
Hosted content
Finally, hosted content – DVGs which are created in part by the consumer but that exist
online (e.g. a Facebook account and uploaded and posted content, avatars and content
465within online games) – also presents new conﬁgurations of ownership. Such  user-
generated content contributes signiﬁcant value to many online platforms (Bonsu &
Darmody, 2008; Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010) and whilst arguments justifying private
property often recognise the link between one’s eﬀort and ownership (Locke, 1690 /
1967 ), in reality, ownership here is limited. For instance whilst Facebook’s terms of
470service declare that ‘You own all of the content and information you post on
Facebook’ the consumer simultaneously grants Facebook a ‘non-exclusive, transferable,
sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or
in connection with Facebook’ (Facebook, 2014). Consumers’ rights to use and transform
such hosted content (within the limits of available code, and abiding by contractual
475agreements) are often non-transferable and bound to a single individual.
In some cases hosted content may be transferred and even re-commodiﬁed, however,
such instances are rare and restrictions may still be in place. For instance content within
virtual world Second Life can be sold for Linden dollars (in world currency) that can be
converted to traditional oﬄine currency, however, the transfer of accounts themselves is
480forbidden without prior written consent from Linden Lab (Linden Research, 2014). In the
case of the massive multiplayer online game, World of Warcraft consumers may
exchange items within the game itself but ‘may not sell in-game items or currency for
“real” money, or exchange those items or currency for value outside of the Game’
(Blizzard, 2014). As with non-transferable licences, where consumers are deemed (by
485the company) to have breached restrictions, their accounts (and therefore access to their
hosted content) may be terminated via code. In such a case, our taken-for-granted
physical networks of law enforcement and interpretation are again circumvented, and
must be re-imposed by consumers with considerable eﬀort if they challenge decisions.
Indeed, for hosted content continuity of access is always precarious since access may
490also be dependent upon continued payment of subscription fees, and on the continua-
tion of platforms themselves.
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Thus beyond full ownership and market-mediated access-based consumption we
observe fragmented ownership conﬁgurations assembled by varying technical and
legal boundaries around customer freedoms, which almost always favour the compa-
495nies’ interests. Our proposed taxonomy of DVG ownership conﬁgurations in Figure 1 is
not intended to be all encompassing, however. Indeed, we recognise that (a) other
ownership conﬁgurations may exist, (b) there are variations within each conﬁguration
presented and (c) goods may transition between conﬁgurations (e.g. a locally stored
photograph uploaded to image hosting website Flickr may become hosted content).
500However, this exercise enables us to better consider how these particular permutations
enact preferred ways for DVGs to be possessed, as we now proceed to do.
Assembling DVG possession
In this section, we consider the implications of the fragmented models of ownership that
we have identiﬁed for practices of possession that can be contrasted with established
505possession assemblages documented in much extant literature on owned material
objects. We organise our analysis around four key themes that emerge as central to
past research on possession: cultivation, movement, contamination and stability. In each
instance we identify ways in which conﬁgurations of ownership may shape this aspect of
possession, alongside instances where the agency of ownership conﬁgurations may be
510met with resistance.
Cultivation
Prior work has examined the ways in which possessions become personally meaningful
as consumers invest time, resources and attention in cultivating their use or maintaining
their special stature (Belk et al., 1989; Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981AQ12 ;
515McCracken, 1986; Richins, 1994a, 1994b). The work needed to transform personal
belongings like a kitchen table (Epp & Price, 2010), a car (Lastovicka & Sirianni, 2011),
a camper van (Belk et al., 1980AQ13 ) or a wedding dress (Lastovicka & Fernandez, 2005) into
precious possessions requires a high level of control. Such objects are generally handled,
cared for and modiﬁed (Belk et al., 1989; Epp & Price, 2010; Lastovicka & Sirianni, 2011) 
520and may be gifted (Belk & Coon, 1993) or bequeathed (Wallendorf & Arnould, 1988).
Such cultivation may be shaped by ownership conﬁgurations inasmuch as the ability to
access, use and transform goods as described by Attas (2006) is distributed in speciﬁed
ways. For DVGs consumer agency may be redistributed to software and hardware. For
example in the non-transferable licence conﬁguration, consumer control is reduced by
525restrictions encoded into the DVGs themselves through DRM, data encryption, digital
watermarks and user plug-ins (Manley & Holley, 2012), now conﬁrmed by legislation. For
example, the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the United States
prohibits unauthorised access to a work by circumventing such technological protection
measures put into place by the copyright owner (Freeman, 2002).
530Such measures are seen in the eBook market with both Amazon and Apple applying
DRM technologies to the eBooks they sell which, amongst other restrictions, makes
them incompatible (unusable) with competing devices and applications. We might see
this as equivalent to buying a paperback that can only be read with a pair of spectacles
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purchased from the same bookstore. The implausibility of this analogy reveals the work
535done by the code in DRM-protected goods. Such restrictions inhibit consumers’ control
over their eBooks. Imagine, for example a reader who accumulates a collection of Kindle
eBooks but is later gifted a Barnes & Noble Nook by a loved one. This individual would
be unable to legally move their existing content onto their new device since the Kindle
Store Terms dictate that Kindle content is used ‘solely on the Kindle or a Reading
540Application’ (Amazon, 2014), a restriction enforced by the DRM technology encoded
within the eBook itself. Consequently, we may come to see eBook collections fragmen-
ted across devices and applications and here restrictions not only prevent copyright
infringement but may also prevent the cultivation of meaning.
Despite legislation prohibiting such actions, however, websites and online forums
545contain explanations of how to strip DRM from eBooks and so reduce the agency of
code in enforcing restrictions on behaviour as consumers seek to share, or simply
transfer their content to another device. Thus companies and code may not always
successfully assemble ownership in ways that restrict behaviour as intended. This is in
line with prior work that documents the ongoing struggle between corporations impos-
550ing legal restrictions on digital music consumption and consumers’ attempts to resist
them (Giesler, 2008). Nevertheless, what might seem reasonable use of a purchased
eBook may now require actions illegal under ownership legislation? Again an analogy
makes the diﬀerence clear – if the code acts as law enforcer, the equivalent consumer
actions for material goods might be disabling store security and evading police.
555Previous research also illustrates that the ability to modify freely facilitates the
cultivation of DVGs within videogames (Denegri-Knott et al., 2012; Watkins &
Molesworth, 2012) yet restrictions are commonly placed on the right to transform
DVGs. The right to transform is again not only stated in contractual agreements, but
also restricted by the customisation options enabled in-game by designers (again, by
560code and to suit the company). In some videogames, extensive customisation options
enable the crafting of DVGs that come to feel ‘unique’. For example, Watkins and
Molesworth (2012) describe a process of customisation performed by one video gamer
who spends hours redecorating her new house within The Sims to suit her own tastes
and desires in order to experience it as her own, noting in contrast that ‘where
565“customisation” involved simply choosing from a few pre-determined options attach-
ment was rarely formed’ (p. 160). By oﬀering only limited control over objects, compa-
nies may therefore limit appropriation and meaning making activity, and subsequently
DVGs’ likely role in consumers identity projects since, as Belk (1988) argues, possessions
are often incorporated within our extended self via control and mastery.
570Yet consumers’ cultivation of DVGs may also be beneﬁcial to corporations seeking
online engagement, hence some online business models encourage consumers to craft
content, but retain ownership of the outcomes of that labour. For example, the virtual
world ‘Second Life’ is in large part the product of the creative labour of its users (Bonsu
& Darmody, 2008). Similarly, although Facebook is assembled from a coded infrastruc-
575ture, the servers on which content is hosted, and the website developers who create and
maintain the platform, it ultimately relies on the consumer to upload and tag multiple
photographs, ﬁll out personal information and continuously provide the up-to-date,
socially valuable information that attracts users and therefore advertisers to the plat-
form. Here end-users’ crafting of hosted content presents the major contribution to the
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580value of these platforms. A Lockean understanding of property holds that consumers
own the products of their labour – that in mixing our labour with an object it becomes
ours (Locke, 1690 /1967 ) – and for Attas (2005, 2006) income rights stem logically from
control rights, however here consumers are granted the right to create and transform
content, but do not beneﬁt from ﬁnancial advantages arising from this activity. The code
585allows possession and ownership to be separated such that meaningful possession may
be assembled with considerable agency from the user, whilst ownership is retained by
the company for the purpose of commercial proﬁt. This system has been subject to
critiques based on the exploitation of consumers’ labour (Bonsu & Darmody, 2008;
Scholz, 2013) and whilst we cannot fully explore them here we note that some assem-
590blages of ownership in the DVG market raise signiﬁcant ethical concerns relating to who
might beneﬁt from content and in what ways.
Movement
A second important theme within studies of possession draws on the idea that objects
have ‘social lives’ (Appadurai, 1986) or ‘biographies’ (Kopytoﬀ, 1986). Research docu-
595ments second hand markets fuelled by goods repeatedly re-entering the commodity
sphere (Belk, Sherry, & Wallendorf, 1988; Denegri-Knott & Molesworth, 2009; Gregson &
Crewe, 2003; Lastovicka & Fernandez, 2005), the passing on of family heirlooms (Price
et al., 2000) and practices of sharing and lending (Belk, 2010; Jenkins et al., 2014). Here
the consumer moves goods from one stage of their biography to the next (Kopytoﬀ,
6001986), however new ownership conﬁgurations may limit their ability to do so. Indeed
many of the movement practices previously documented may lack a digital virtual
equivalent since many DVGs are in eﬀect ‘terminal commodities’ (Appadurai, 1988AQ14 )
prohibited by code from being re-sold, passed on or bequeathed. Indeed, as consumers
accrue cherished, personally meaningful digital possessions both scholars and consu-
605mers are beginning to consider the notions of digital heirlooms and digital legacy
(Carroll & Romano, 2010; Odom, Harper, Sellen, Kirk, & Banks, 2010, 2012), and yet
legal ownership emerges as a key obstacle.
Again commercial motives are implicated in the transformations that may be wit-
nessed. Digital artefacts exhibit pure ‘non-rivarly in use’ since use of a digital artefact by
610one person does not aﬀect its simultaneous use by others (Faulkner & Runde, 2011).
Once a digital artefact exists the cost of providing this non-rival object to an additional
user is zero – sending an mp3 ﬁle to a friend (or indeed to one million ‘friends’) does not
prevent a consumer from continuing to use it themselves. From a company’s perspec-
tive, however, this abundance (Lehdonvirta & Castronova, 2014) has signiﬁcant conse-
615quences. Where DVGs can be duplicated, indeﬁnitely exchange value is lost (why would
consumers pay for an mp3 ﬁle when another consumer can provide a copy for free?).
Consequently companies use code to prevent consumers from engaging in unauthor-
ized sharing (Koiso-Kanttil, 2004), but such actions have other consequences for
possession.
620As an illustration of this, in 2012 actor Bruce Willis was reportedly preparing to sue
Apple over the right to bequeath his iTunes music collection to his daughters (Child,
2012). Whilst this claim was later refuted (Arthur, 2012), it raises the question of whether
we can indeed pass on our DVGs to others. Legal scholarship highlights this as a grey
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area due to the existence of much content within non-transferable accounts (Wong,
6252012). World of Warcraft’s Terms of Use, for instance, state that it ‘does not recognize the
transfer of World of Warcraft Accounts [. . .] You may not purchase, sell, gift or trade any
Account’ (Blizzard, 2014). Thus whereas we may have passed down our treasured
material possessions to our children, repeating this practice with a World of Warcraft
avatar would breach the service’s Terms of Use. It appears that (if such restrictions are
630adhered to) many of our digital virtual possessions will expire with us. Thus the
prevalence of family heirlooms, and more broadly the concept of ‘second hand goods’
with a history of previous ownership, may be eroded as possessions become digital.
Practices of lending are similarly restricted. For example, although Barnes & Noble
enables users to lend certain ‘LendMe’ compatible eBooks to friends, the length of this
635arrangement is restricted to 14 days (after which the eBook is automatically returned)
rather than socially negotiated between lender and borrower, and unlike material books
each eBook may be lent only once (Barnes & Noble, 2014). Here messy and complex
social practices of lending through which human bonds are made, reinforced and
reﬂected on (see Jenkins et al., 2014) are replaced by straightforward and utilitarian
640processes largely stripped of their social dimensions in favour of controls that suit the IP
holder. Social norms and systems of law enforcement become less signiﬁcant actants as
ownership, and subsequently possession, is increasingly assembled through code.
Such restrictions may potentially produce limited biographies in which movement
between consumers is rare and an already individualised consumer culture (Bauman,
6452007) becomes more so as social practices of consumption become less common.
Indeed typically contractual agreements require an agreement between a singular
individual and the company and thus whilst conﬁgurations of shared ownership have
been documented, and are particularly prominent in certain cultures (see Belk, 2010),
ownership of DVGs is largely assembled by companies as singular (with some exceptions
650such as iTunes Home Sharing).
Whilst sharing, lending and gifting practices may frequently be forbidden, this does
not necessarily mean that they do not take place. As noted above, advice for removing
DRM restrictions is available online, whilst consumers may also lend friends and family
their e-reader or account details instead in order to circumvent companies’ restrictions.
655Similarly, a look at popular video gaming forums reveals contributors planning to pass
on their accounts to friends or family, or admitting to sharing an account with their
partner, despite recognising that such actions are prohibited by contractual agreements.
Thus ownership is not governed solely by corporations and their interests but is shaped
too by the end consumer whose sense of possession, and desire for established
660possession practices, still renders such restrictions diﬃcult to enforce. However, we
speculate that the more important DVGs are to us the less likely, we may be to take
the risk of breaching contractual agreements since in doing so we risk losing access to
our precious content, particularly given increased potential for companies’ on-going
surveillance of use.
665Thus the more consumers invest meaning and value in DVGs the more agency
companies’ ownership conﬁgurations may come to hold over consumers’ behaviour.
The removal of clear legal actants in favour of company imposed agreements, surveil-
lance measures and code brings with it new risks for consumers that have yet to be fully
recognized.
16 R. D. WATKINS ET AL.
670Contamination
The meaning of material goods also involves contamination, understood as pollution or
‘matter out of place’ (Douglas, 1984), which is sought or avoided in transforming objects
into personally meaningful possessions and in securing their sacred status (Belk, 1988;
Belk et al., 1989). Negative pollutants ( e.g. use by a stranger) are said to produce disgust
675or to profane the otherwise sacred dimension of possessions (Belk, 1988; Belk et al.,
1989; Lastovicka & Fernandez, 2005). Positive contamination too has been studied, with
work concluding that proximity to another’s body, or to sacred place or objects, charges
items with positive meanings. For example, clothes once owned or worn by someone
famous may be highly valued (Lastovicka & Miller, 2012).
680Digitally, such contamination may be present in negative messages accrued in social
media platforms in hosted content ownership conﬁgurations and as market mediation is
a focal force in the enactment of possession of DVGs market contamination may be a
particular issue. For instance, digital music collections may be negatively contaminated
by unwanted DVGs, as in the case of Apple automatically downloading a U2 album onto
685consumers’ iTunes playlists for promotional reasons (Williams, 2014). As user data is also
‘owned’ by service providers and used for marketing any of consumers’ accounts may
also be contaminated by advertising content. Treasured archives on social media or
e-mail may only be accessed with accompanying, targeted advertising. The enactment
of possession of many DVGs sees the speed and volume of pollutants increased with
690consumers’ lack of control. Yet the lack of sharing and transfer or physical touch may
limit the possibility of positive contamination. For example, a digital ﬁle of a book
manuscript by a famous author may not have the aura of a hand-written one.
Stability
Finally, we may consider how possessions provide continuity and stability for meaning
695and identity. Ideas relating to goods as ‘extensions of the self’ suggest that material
possessions can serve as identity anchors, providing a sense of permanence in the world
by maintaining the continuity of the self through time and across locations (Belk, 1990,
1991, 1992; Kleine Kleine and Allen, 1995; Schultz, Kleine, & Kernan, 1989; Tobin, 1996),
whilst the loss of treasured possessions may result in a ‘shrinkage of our personality, a
700partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness’ (James, 1890, p. 178). Investment of the
self in possessions suggests a conﬁdence that these items will indeﬁnitely remain within
the consumer’s exclusive control (Penner, 1996), and where this assurance is absent
possession is ‘insecure’ (Litwinski cited in Rudmin, 1990) and ‘unstable’ (Munzer, 1990).
Rudmin (1990) proposes that only total ownership provides the security necessary to
705guarantee expectation of future use and enjoyment. In material consumption individuals
assume stability in the objects they purchase, and that their rights of ownership will not
later be revoked. In contrast, for access-based consumption, temporary rights to access
and use goods is typically made explicit; we are aware that we must return our hired car
by a speciﬁed date and in the DVG market subscription-based ownership conﬁgurations
710such as Spotify and Netﬂix also clearly position access as temporary. Yet in the case of
the hosted content ownership conﬁguration, there may be a perception of permanence
but no guarantee of continued access.
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In discussing ownership of social media content, Werbin (2012, p. 256) proposes that
‘content produced by users remains their property, but only in name, as control over the
715market exchange of said property, as well as control over its perpetuation on the
platform, occur wholly at the discretion of the corporation.’ Accounts may not just be
terminated for violation of the company’s terms, but also for commercial reasons
(including insolvency), whilst data loss is another risk. For instance, Scaraboto, Carter-
Schneider, and Kedzior (2013) illustrate that in investing signiﬁcant labour in Disney’s
720adverworld, ‘Virtual Magic Kingdom’ users developed a sense of co-ownership and an
assumption of continued access, however Disney later terminated the platform (and
consequently consumers’ hosted content) and were within their legal rights to do so.
Pearce and Artemesia (2009) document a similar instance of loss, documenting the
experiences of self-proclaimed ‘refugees’ following the closure of their game world,
725‘Uru: Ages Beyond Myst’. Thus the continued persistence of hosted content is rarely
certain. Even non-transferable licences are not beyond retrieval as demonstrated by
Amazon in 2009 when copies of the eBooks ‘1984’ and ‘Animal Farm’ by George Orwell
were remotely deleted from consumers’ Kindle devices (Stone, 2009).
Increasingly we see companies encouraging consumers’ to engage in meaningful,
730long-term relationships with DVGs so that their actions can be monetised. For example
in 2011, Google released an advertisement featuring a father sending anecdotes, photo-
graphs and videos to his daughter throughout her childhood via Google’s e-mail service,
with the intention of one day reﬂecting on these e-mails together (Bazilian, 2011). Here
Google speciﬁcally invites users to create treasured digital scrapbooks, whilst social
735media and blogs are also used for this purpose. Indeed, it was estimated that 5% of
children under two have a social media proﬁle (AVG, 2010), with parents increasingly
uploading treasured photographs and messages to be read in years to come. Watkins
and Molesworth (2012) also demonstrate that consumers do form strong emotional
attachments to hosted DVGs within massive multiplayer online games (one participant
740talks lovingly of her World of Warcraft avatar, e.g. describing her as ‘my baby’). However
consumers cannot rest assured that these lovingly crafted digital objects will remain
available for their own reﬂection, let alone for their children to reﬂect on as adults. World
of Warcraft provider Blizzard Entertainment, for example retains the right to terminate
an individual’s account, ‘for any reason or no reason, with or without notice’ (Blizzard,
7452014). Similarly Google does not guarantee the permanence of the platform it promotes
as a depository for memories. Their lack of permanence again leads us to consider how
such relationships with personally meaningful yet unstable digital virtual possessions
may relate to consumer identity projects. Belk (1988) notes the potential for signiﬁcant
‘lessening’ of the self where highly appropriated possessions (facilitated by the ability to
750access, use, transform and manage these items) are lost, and here appropriated digital
virtual possessions may be lost is due to technology malfunction, account termination or
service closure.
Yet consumers may again adopt new practices in response to this situation. For
instance, in Watkins and Molesworth (2012) study of video gamers, one participant
755invested in a Security Token that generated one-time-use passwords in order to protect
his Final Fantasy XI Online account from hackers in an attempt to increase continuity
and control, whilst another responded to an experience of loss with deliberate emo-
tional detachment from his digital virtual possessions in an attempt to protect himself
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from the consequences of anticipated future loss. Thus in contrast to permanent and
760temporary access, indeﬁnite access to DVGs can produce tense and problematic posses-
sion where these DVGs are assembled as meaningful possessions.
Discussion and conclusions
Previous studies of possession have privileged the agency of the consumer subject and
whilst existing work by Epp and Price (2010) acknowledges the role of other actants in
765shaping possession, here we have illustrated that in the context of DVGs, new ownership
conﬁgurations become particularly important in the assembling of possession. Our
analysis highlights a complex network of new actants, in particular illustrating the
agency of code in restricting the behaviours of consumers in relation to these items in
favour of the interests of corporations. We propose that these emerging conﬁgurations
770of ownership may also produce new conﬁgurations of possession whereby access to, use
and management of DVGs as well their use as linking devices to others, may be
compromised. A result is that achieving the alignment between self, object and others
that establishes personally meaningful possession (Richins, 1994AQ15 ) and facilitates self-
extension (Belk, 1988) may become problematic. Furthermore, where DVGs do become
775meaningful extensions of the self, we have seen that limited ownership conﬁgurations
may leave possession susceptible to disruption, and therefore may leave consumers
susceptible to the lessening of the self that may be caused by the loss of personally
meaningful possessions (Belk, 1988). In short, digital technologies have disrupted the
established assemblages of ownership and possession, revealing their contingencies and
780allowing for new realities of both, for new networks of relationships, and for diﬀerent
ontological politics. For marketers and consumers, this is resulting in both new oppor-
tunities (assess-based business models and new markets for DVGs) and risks (possession
without full ownership, a reduction in the desire to possess) as yet not fully understood.
Our analysis therefore contributes to critical discussions of digital virtual consumption
785(e.g. Bonsu & Darmody, 2008; Scholz, 2013; Terranova, 2000) by illustrating the ways in
which ownership may both restrict the ways in which DVGs can come to be possessed,
and result in consumer behaviours that (for now) resist attempts to limit ownership.
Thus whereas Bardhi et al. (2012) and others (e.g. Belk, 2014b; Rifkin, 2000) position
DVGs as potentially liberating consumers from the burdens of ownership, our analysis
790draws attention to cases where consumers may be unable to control or exploit these
goods fully, even where they are largely products of their own labour.
The ways in which consumers respond to these fragmented ownership forms pre-
sents a promising area for empirical work. Fragmented ownership structures present
signiﬁcant and yet to be fully realised consequences for the end consumers of DVGs and
795this is particularly problematic given the multitude of evidence to suggest that EULAs
and Terms of Service agreements are rarely read. In Chee, Taylor, and De Castell (2012)
study of online gamers, only 3% reported that they read the entire contractual agree-
ment and 62% read none of its content, a ﬁnding echoed in a range of contexts
including social media (Debatin, Lovejoy Horn & Hughes, 2009; Gross & Acquisti,
8002005), smartphone applications (Cotton & Bolan, 2012) and a broad array of  third-
party software (Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, & Trossen, 2009). Even where contractual agree-
ments are read their content may leave the consumer confused as to exactly what rights
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they hold, resulting in assumptions based on existing understandings of the relationship
between possession and ownership (often drawing from experiences of material con-
805sumption). This may result in tensions where a corporation regards its oﬀering as access
to a service, but the consumer comes to perceive the same DVGs as possessions.
Perhaps most worrying is the existence of DVGs within platforms (be it software or
webpages) owned and controlled by corporations who are able to change the terms of
contractual agreements at any time, assembling ownership in ways which best serves
810their current interests. Here we see potential for ensnarement whereby consumers
invest labour, time or money into a platform and in doing so ﬁnd it diﬃcult to leave
when the terms of use are changed. Thus whilst a consideration of the morality of DVG
ownership structures was beyond the scope of this  article, this is clearly an area
demanding consideration. We note instances of consumers removing DRM and sharing
815and passing on ‘non-transferable’ accounts, for example, and here we witness clashes of
agency. In particular the emergence of coping mechanisms to deal with unstable
possession, such  attempts to regain control and decisions to detach oneself from
DVGs, presents an interesting area for further study.
More broadly, our analysis highlights the limitations of the emerging full ownership
820versus access dichotomy and leads us to question claims of the reduced relevance of
ownership in studies of consumption (Bardhi et al., 2012; Belk, 2013; Chen, 2009).
Indeed, the assumption of this reduced relevance by marketers may lead them to exploit
new commercial assemblages of fragmented ownership that restrict practices of posses-
sion by consumers, raising new public policy concerns. We argue that in its fragmenta-
825tion ownership actually becomes increasingly signiﬁcant in studies of possession, and
consumption more broadly, potentially transforming existing consumer culture and
market relations.
In conclusion, we have theorised the relationship between ownership and possession,
highlighting key points of intersection. We have then proposed that ownership conﬁg-
830urations may limit consumers’ scope of action relative to an object and that restrictions
on consumers’ ability to use and transform possessions may potentially inhibit their
capacity to cultivate possession meaning, whilst the movement of a possession from
one person to another, through practices such as gifting, divestment, bequeathing may
exist only under certain conﬁgurations of ownership whereby the consumer’s rights to
835the object are transferable. We have also argued that fragmented ownership conﬁgura-
tions may leave possession susceptible to disruption; where the continuity of consu-
mers’ rights to an object is questionable possession may indeed be tense and unstable,
with a threat of loss. Indeed, when an object is under the complete control of a
consumer they may be able to avoid the negative contamination from other people
840and things that in consumer research has been described as degrading possessions.
Furthermore, we propose that consumers’ continued possession attempts may impinge
upon the agency of ownership mechanisms within the market, potentially limiting the
ability of ownership conﬁgurations to restrict behaviour as intended. In doing this, we
provide a framework for future empirical studies both in the context of DVGs and
845beyond. Indeed, whilst particularly evident in the DVG market, ownership is perhaps
increasingly fragmented and always assembled, and the software component of many
technologies brings about further complex fragmentation. A mobile phone may only
work with licenced operating systems and service agreements with network providers,
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for example, and although it is possible to jailbreak a mobile phone in order to remove
850 company-imposed restrictions, this typically voids the device’s warranty. Thus although
DVGs present a particularly salient case, in part due to increased ability to monitor use
and enforce restrictions, the understanding of ownership as existing in fragmented
conﬁgurations and the conceptualisation of the relationship of ownership and posses-
sion developed in this article can be applied to a much broader range of contexts.
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